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Modern Politics and the Passions 
David Bradshaw1 
 
I was surprised when I began teaching political philosophy some years ago to realize the degree 
of cynicism among my students. One thinks of college students as naïve and idealistic, and no 
doubt in some respects they are. When it comes to politics, though, they are only too aware that 
money rules the world, and they tend to see politics as little more than the arena in which 
competing interests try to squeeze what they can out of the system. The recent support many 
students gave to Bernie Sanders’s proposal for free tuition was, I think, simply an attempt to 
claim what they see as their fair share of the spoils. 
I used to suppose that what the students needed most was to grapple with classic 
philosophical texts. When you know nothing of the sources lying behind our political discourse, 
it is natural to suppose that the entire wild and sometimes appalling spectacle is just so much 
gamesmanship. Surely, I thought, what the students need is to see that principles really matter, 
and that the strident voices who dominate the media are just the froth on the waves of a rich and 
complex tradition. 
Having taught many classes, and many bright but cynical students, I have come to a 
different conclusion. I now think that the roots of my students’ cynicism lie within our political 
tradition itself. After all, a greater knowledge of the tradition often leads merely to a more 
refined and sophisticated cynicism. The higher cynicism even has a name—the so-called 
“hermeneutics of suspicion,” deriving from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, which reigns without 
challenge in many quarters of academia. 
                                                          
1 David Bradshaw thanks the John H. Schnatter Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise for financial support. 
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If more education is not the answer, then it is hard to say where within our educational 
system, or indeed within our society at large, there is hope of a better way. I shall argue here that 
our best hope, even within politics, lies with the churches. In order to explain, I will first 
elaborate more fully how our political tradition legitimately and understandably gives rise to 
cynicism. Once we see the nature of the problem, it will become evident why the churches alone 
can provide an answer. 
 
John Locke: Theorist of the Independent Individual 
Let us begin with perhaps the greatest work of early modern political philosophy, John Locke’s 
Second Treatise of Government (1689). Locke’s central argument is that by natural law “no one 
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions,” and that it is to protect these 
rights that governments are instituted. The influence of this argument can hardly be overstated. 
Most famously, of course, it informs the Declaration of Independence. Years after the 
Revolution, Jefferson recalled that the Declaration “was intended to be an expression of the 
American mind” and that “all its authority rests on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, 
whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public 
right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c.” No theory of natural rights is to be found in 
Aristotle, Cicero, or Sidney, however, and it is primarily to Locke that this key element is due. 
Locke’s theory of property has been almost as influential. Locke postulates that in the 
state of nature each man is free to appropriate natural goods subject to two limitations: that he 
take no more than he can use, and that he leave enough for others. Such use plausibly includes 
exchange with others. Eventually money is invented to facilitate exchange, and of course money, 
unlike organic goods, does not spoil. The requirement to take only what one can use thus 
5 
 
becomes effectively a dead letter. Presumably (although Locke does not spell this out) there is 
also no possibility that accumulating money will fail to leave enough for others, for however 
much money one has, others remain free to barter as they choose. It turns out, then, that the state 
of nature, although it is “a state … of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is 
reciprocal, no one having more than another,” it is also a state of sharp economic inequality. No 
one may complain of such a result, for by engaging in the use of money all have given “tacit and 
voluntary consent” to the inequality that it enables. 
Locke sets forth his position with admirable clarity. However, the very features that make 
him a model of calm, orderly reasoning also render him vulnerable to criticism. Locke 
recognizes that it is not enough simply to assert the existence of a natural law; he must argue for 
it. One of his key arguments is that since human beings are “all the workmanship of one 
omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker … they are his property, whose workmanship they are, 
made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure.” Having made this argument, Locke then 
immediately sets it aside. He does not ask the obvious question: if we are all God’s property, 
ought not we to inquire what his will for us is, including whether he lays upon us a positive duty 
to help others? Occasionally he does seem open to this possibility, speaking of a duty “to 
preserve the rest of mankind.” This phrase might refer either to a merely negative duty not to 
harm others, or to a positive duty to help them. Locke evidently takes it in the former sense, for 
he gives positive duties no role within his theory of government. 
Locke’s theory of property also far outstrips its rational basis. The key claim is that all 
have given implicit consent to the unequal distribution of property merely by the use of money. 
Two simple rejoinders come to mind. First, there may be no practical alternative to the use of 
money, because others may require it as a medium of exchange. If so, then how does using it 
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commit one to accept whatever results it ultimately enables? We normally require some effective 
freedom in entering an agreement in order to regard that agreement as binding; why should this 
case be different? Second, even if Locke were right about the state of nature, it is far from clear 
what this has to do with property within civil society. Once the social contract is established, 
much that was legitimate in the state of nature becomes subject to regulation through majority 
rule. Why not property as well? 
Finally, before leaving Locke we must note his rather surprising position on slavery. One 
might suppose that, since all have a natural right to liberty, slavery could have no place in the 
Lockean state. But one would be wrong. Any violation of the law of nature may justly be 
punished in a way that is roughly proportionate to the crime. This means that one who unjustly 
seeks the life of another thereby forfeits his own right to life, and with it (a fortiori) his right to 
liberty. That already seems rather questionable, but Locke goes on to add that the same is true of 
anyone on the wrong side in a just war. Hence captives taken in war, assuming one’s own side to 
be just, may be made slaves.  
Locke does not discuss how this rationale pertains to the actual slavery of his day, but it 
is not hard to fill in the gaps. Presumably the obligation of ensuring that someone has been 
enslaved justly lies with the one who originally enslaved him. Commerce in general presupposes 
that items placed for sale may be assumed to have been lawfully acquired unless there is reason 
to think otherwise. Presumably, then, one may reasonably assume that slaves on the market were 
acquired justly. Locke himself invested in multiple slaving companies and helped oversee the 
commerce between Africa and America as a member of the royal Board of Trade. Although he 
does not address the issue explicitly, it may have been by reasoning such as this that he justified 
to himself his own involvement in the slave trade. 
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The point of these observations is not to denigrate Locke, nor even to deny the value of 
some of his ideas. It is to point out the large gap between his arguments and the vision of society 
they are invoked to support. The Lockean vision is of a society formed by independent, 
autonomous individuals who come together for strictly limited purposes, particularly that of 
protecting their natural rights. This is a vision that has had remarkable staying power—most 
obviously on the small-government right, but also on the “no one can tell me what to do with my 
own body” left. It is an appealing vision, yet the more one inquires into its foundations, the more 
it seems to evaporate into thin air. 
 
Rousseau: Theorist of Oppression 
Locke’s hubris eventually provoked a fateful reaction. The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1755) inverts virtually every key Lockean proposition. Whereas 
Locke’s natural law is the eternal guidance given to us by God or reason (terms Locke treats as 
functionally equivalent), Rousseau’s is no more than our natural impulse to self-preservation and 
the avoidance of suffering. Crucially, Rousseau’s natural law is descriptive, not prescriptive; it 
describes the “natural sentiment” we already possess and to which we only have to listen in order 
to be good.  
Rousseau is, in general, deeply skeptical of reason. Speaking of the human soul within 
society, he laments that “instead of that heavenly and majestic simplicity whose mark its author 
had left on it, one no longer finds anything but the grotesque contrast of passion which thinks it 
reasons and an understanding in a state of delirium.” “Passion which thinks it reasons” could 
well stand as Rousseau’s definition of man within society. For Rousseau, the appropriate attitude 
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to the claims of reason is suspicion. Rousseau’s thought on this point is one of the headwaters 
that led to the hermeneutics of suspicion mentioned earlier. 
Rousseau deals with Locke’s other great mainstay, God, equally brusquely. He does not 
deny the existence of God, nor even the relevance of theology to politics. But he defines his task 
in a way that makes God irrelevant. He explains at the outset of the work, “Religion commands 
us to believe that since God himself drew men out of the state of nature, they are unequal 
because he wanted them to be so; but it does not forbid us from conjectures, drawn solely from 
the nature of man and the beings that surround him, concerning what the human race could have 
become, if it had been left to itself.” With this simple gesture God is ushered off stage, never to 
reappear. 
Having disposed of God and reason, Rousseau is free to set about his real task, that of 
offering a radically new imaginative vision. Whereas Lockean man is free, rational, and 
independent, Rousseauian man is a child who only comes to invent reason gradually in the 
course of seeking to gratify his passions. Since the invention is motivated from the beginning by 
the passions, it remains tinged by them even when it pretends to objectivity. The social contract, 
in particular, is something entirely different than it seems. Rousseau agrees with Locke regarding 
its explicit terms—the creation of a police and judiciary for the protection of life and property—
but he sees these as merely a ruse put forward by the rich to enslave the poor. In his imaginative 
retelling, government was formed when the rich said to the poor, “Let us unite in order to protect 
the weak from oppression, restrain the ambitious, and assure everyone of possessing what 
belongs to him.” The result, Rousseau dryly remarks, was that the poor “all ran to chain 
themselves, in the belief that they secured their liberty.” 
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It is on this basis that Rousseau introduces perhaps his most important legacy for 
contemporary politics, the vision of society as a structure of oppression. If we were to examine 
human history in detail, he writes, “we would see the multitude oppressed from within as a 
consequence of the very precautions it had taken against what menaced it from without. We 
would see oppression continually increase, without the oppressed ever being able to know where 
it would end or what legitimate means would be left for them to stop it.” The work ends with an 
impassioned protest against all “moral” (that is, social) inequality: 
It follows that moral inequality, authorized by positive right alone, is contrary to 
natural right whenever it is not combined in the same proportion with physical 
inequality … for it is obviously contrary to the law of nature, however it may be 
defined, for a child to command an old man, for an imbecile to lead a wise man, 
and for a handful of people to gorge themselves on superfluities while the starving 
multitude lack necessities. 
 
Rationalizing the Passions 
In teaching this text, I used to expect students to balk at its staggering inconsistencies and non 
sequiturs. Rousseau begins by dismissing anything like Lockean natural right on the grounds that 
it is a mistake to apply civilized notions of justice and property to the state of nature. Rousseau’s 
own natural law is nothing but a description of the instinctual tendencies we share with the 
animals. How then could it possibly underwrite such a sweeping moral condemnation? In fact 
the tell-tale phrase “however it may be defined” tells us that Rousseau is at this point no longer 
relying on his own argument, but upon our prior intuitions. One is left to wonder what has 
become of his skepticism regarding previous versions of natural law and his attempt to replace 
them with mere instinct. 
I have learned, though, that although students may recognize Rousseau’s inconsistencies, 
they remain drawn to his imaginative vision. The vision is, after all, deeply flattering. It assures 
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me that I am innately good and that any evil impulses I may feel are due to society. Even better, 
if I belong to an oppressed group then I have the additional assurance that whatever I and those 
like me suffer is not our fault. This gives whatever resentment we may feel a kind of 
philosophical imprimatur, conveniently without the need to invoke any higher lawgiver—
whether God or reason. Rousseau thus offers a heady mixture of group solidarity, freedom from 
personal accountability, and the assurance of righteousness. It is no wonder that the fundamental 
framework of oppression and liberation he laid out has become today the dominant way of 
thinking about society, used by all who can with any plausibility claim to be victims. 
That being said, in fairness one must note that the older and more staid vision of Locke is 
also, in its own way, deeply flattering. It tells me that I am free, independent, and the equal of all 
others in my fundamental rights and dignity. My freedom means that I am subject to no positive 
obligations other than those that I choose to take on, and that I can in principle walk away from 
almost any commitment. (Locke makes an exception for the obligations of parenthood, which he 
views as binding under natural law.) Most notably, my acquisitive impulses are natural and good, 
and no amount of wealth imposes upon me an obligation to help others. 
Standing back from both visions, it is plain what they have in common. Both make use of 
specious reasoning to justify what are, from the classical and Christian standpoint, mere 
passions. In Locke the passions are greed, the desire for domination, and the sort of pride which 
says that no one can tell me what to do. In Rousseau they are envy, resentment, and the pride 
which says that anything wrong in my life is someone else’s fault. In each case, the governing 
passions of the vision remain invisible to its partisans while they are obvious to almost everyone 
else. That is why modern politics inevitably produces cynicism, for cynicism is the natural 
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response when one sees people serving their passions in the interest of what they claim to be 
higher values. 
 
Seeking a Better Way 
Although cynicism is the natural response, it is not the right one. When all the world seems to be 
mad, the right thing to do is to ask how things got this way and whether something is missing 
that could set them aright. In the present case, that something is the classical and Christian 
understanding of the passions. Within that earlier tradition, the passions were seen not as brute 
facts to be accepted and rationalized, but as the raw material in an ongoing process of personal 
transformation. Modern politics was born out of the rejection of that classical vision. It is small 
wonder that, having abdicated the task of educating and transforming the passions, we now find 
ourselves subservient to them. 
In the case of both ancient and modern philosophy, the way the passions are understood 
is largely a function of the prior understanding of reason. The modern conception of reason was 
stated succinctly by Locke. He defines reason as “the discovery of the certainty or probability of 
such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which 
it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection.” In other words, it is 
the act (or, we might add, the faculty) of scrutinizing the contents of the mind and inferring from 
them truths about the world. Given such a view, there is nothing about reason that gives it any 
intrinsic moral authority or that makes it distinctively fitted to govern the soul. After all, it is 
often the passions that in fact drive us, even when we think we are acting against them. David 
Hume, who took many of Locke’s ideas to their logical conclusion, famously maintained that 
“reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other 
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office than to serve and obey them.” Hume thus recognized the priority of the passions even 
before Rousseau, although it was left to Rousseau to translate this view into the political sphere. 
The classical view of reason was very different. One can already see it forming in 
Anaxagoras, for whom intellect (nous) orders all things. Plato and Aristotle built upon this view. 
For Plato intellect is both each person’s truest self and the beneficent god, the Demiurge, who 
created and orders the cosmos. We achieve “assimilation to God” to the extent that our intellect 
is conformed to the eternal rational patterns imparted to creation by the Demiurge. (Plato 
remarks wryly that we are like plants walking around with our roots in the air, since that which 
roots us in the cosmos is intellect.) Aristotle elaborated this view via his thesis of the identity of 
intellect and its object. This is, roughly, that when our intellects successfully apprehend the 
structure of reality they are not merely harmonized with that structure, but become identical with 
it, in the sense that they become local participations in the eternal divine intellect. Crucially, for 
both Plato and Aristotle the eternal structure thus apprehended is not only factual in the modern 
sense, but includes the recognition of that which is good. To be fully rational is thus to be fully 
good; there is no possibility of a gap between fact and value. 
The implications of this view for the soul are both straightforward and profound. As is 
well known, Plato distinguished three parts of the soul: reason, passion (or spirit), and appetite. 
Reason is far more than simply the faculty of inference, as with Locke; it is the faculty of 
apprehending and participating in the eternal divine structure of reality. The aim of ethical life is 
to subordinate passion and appetite to reason, thereby enabling them to participate in divine 
reason in the manner appropriate to them. Plato’s Republic is in large part simply an instruction 
manual for how such harmony is to be achieved. The process begins in childhood with music, 
poetry, and gymnastics—music and poetry to help reason learn to recognize that which is noble, 
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while gymnastics (or, as we might say, athletics) arouses the spirit and accustoms it to receive 
the direction of reason. Young adults then progress through the study of arithmetic, geometry, 
astronomy, and harmonics, studies that habituate them to value intelligible truth and to 
appreciate the good and the beautiful in many different forms. Those who excel then advance to 
dialectic—roughly speaking, philosophical debate—and finally to fifteen years of military and 
public service. Only after this long, cumulative training are those who remain steadfast through 
many trials finally enabled, through the deeply engrained ordering of their soul, to behold the 
good. 
Like other aspects of the Republic, the rigid schematism of this program is probably 
exaggerated for dramatic effect. Nonetheless the core idea—that education can help habituate the 
soul to recognize and respond to the good—is fundamental for Plato and indeed the entire 
classical tradition. Aristotle carried further Plato’s emphasis on habituation, arguing that the 
virtues are a kind of habit and so are acquired, like any habit, by repeatedly performing the 
corresponding act. One must begin by facing down the bully on the playground or one’s fear of 
pain in sports in order to become capable of facing death on the battlefield. As with Plato, such 
habituation is also a progress into knowledge. One who has acquired the virtues comes to take 
pleasure in acts that truly are pleasant by nature, rather than those that seem pleasant but 
ultimately turn bitter. The long process of learning to be good is, in other words, also that of 
coming to see things as they truly are. 
 
The Christian Spiritual Disciplines 
From a Christian perspective, there is much here that is true and salutary. Perhaps the most 
crucial bridge between the philosophers and the Gospel was the Johannine teaching that Christ is 
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the Logos. As “the true Light which lighteth every man,” the Logos is present not only in the 
cosmos at large and the person of Christ, but in the human soul. This fit precisely the 
philosophical understanding of human reason as a participation in the divine reason. The 
difference, of course, was that, in the Christian view, the divine reason had become incarnate. 
The Incarnation opened a door through which the classical education and transformation 
of the passions, previously available only to the elite through philosophy, became available to 
all. The palpable love to be found within the new community of the ekklesia, and above all the 
sacrifice of the martyrs, offered proof that even the uneducated could attain to a kind of heavenly 
virtue. Justin Martyr, who had been trained as a philosopher, described succinctly both the old 
and the radically new: “No one trusted in Socrates so as to die for his doctrine, but many now 
trust in Christ, who was partially known even by Socrates—for he was and is the Logos that is in 
every man.” 
Above all, it was within monasticism that Christians appropriated and transformed the 
classical disciplines of the passions. There is unfortunately still a tendency to view monasticism 
as did Luther, as a form of works righteousness aimed at earning salvation. Nothing could be 
further from the historical reality of ancient monasticism. Perhaps the simplest way to view 
ancient monasticism is as the utmost extremity of self-giving. The monks took to heart the 
commandment of Christ to the rich man to sell all you have and give to the poor, and come, 
follow me. They also took to heart the saying that you must be born again; they understood it to 
refer not to a one-time experience, however, but the continual practice of letting go of all things 
in order to make room for new life. 
The monastic disciplines include much that, even today, one can recognize as deeply 
consonant with a Christian way of life: fasting, vigils, constant prayer, immersion in Scripture, 
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confession of sins, hospitality to strangers, not judging others, obedience to an elder, the 
acceptance of insults, the patient endurance of suffering, learning to be content with silence and 
solitude. These are very different from the disciplines of classical philosophy. In the monastic 
tradition, taming the passions is seen less as a way of enabling the entire soul to participate in 
divine reason (laudable though that might be) than as a way of transferring the very locus of 
one’s identity from self to God. Spiritual vistas were thereby opened up that were unknown to 
the ancient philosophers.  
Yet there was continuity as well, for the monastic life, like classical philosophy, 
presupposes an ontology in which the divine is at the heart of the human. In an early monastic 
rule by St. Basil the Great the question is posed, “Speak to us first, therefore, of the love of God; 
for we have heard that we must love Him, but we would learn how this may be rightly 
accomplished.” Basil replies: 
The love of God is not something that is taught, for we do not learn from another 
to rejoice in the light or to desire life, nor has anyone taught us to love our parents 
or nurses. In the same way and even to a far greater degree it is true that 
instruction in divine law is not from without, but, simultaneously with the 
formation of the creature—man, I mean—a kind of rational force is implanted in 
us like a seed, which by an inherent tendency impels us toward love. This germ is 
then received into account in the school of God’s commandments, where it is 
wont to be carefully cultivated and skillfully nurtured and thus, by the grace of 
God, brought to its full perfection. 
 
For Basil the monastic disciplines are a kind of “school” that directs our innate love of beauty 
and goodness toward its proper end. Fasting, vigils, and prayer, for example, take the natural 
love of comfort and direct it instead toward God. Hospitality teaches one to seek the good of 
others before one’s own, while confession teaches one to blame only oneself, never others. The 
habit of not judging and of accepting insults offers the very wounds one has suffered as a 
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sacrifice to the only righteous judge. Through such practices, repeated daily and habitually, the 
love of God that is innate to all of us blossoms into its fully reality. 
 
Why Only the Churches Hold the Cure 
The monastic disciplines are, of course, no more than an extreme form of those to which all 
Christians are called. Yet without the monastic presence they are easily lost. In the ancient 
church monasticism served as a kind of leaven, a permanent transformative element that revealed 
new patterns of holiness. Soon monastic practices—such as lengthy periods of fasting, vigils, and 
regular confession—found their way into the life of the laity. Of course they had to be 
accommodated to the conditions of life in the world, and inevitably abuses arose. Even so, for 
most of Christian history the prominence of these practices as a cultural norm provided a check 
to the untrammeled reign of the passions.  
Today they survive in only a residual form, having been relaxed or redefined almost to 
the point of nonexistence. Yet where they are still practiced they are just as life giving as ever. In 
my own experience, perhaps their most surprising effect has been how they rivet one’s life to the 
liturgical calendar. Periods of fasting and feasting, of penitence and joy come to shape the 
rhythms of life in a way determined not by one’s own moods or desires, but by the independent 
vitality of the church. Even when an act is private, as with confession, it is still something done 
as part of a common journey with others. The power of the ancient disciplines is most vividly 
apparent at the end of the Lenten fast, when young and old, the devout and the casually 
observant alike are swept up in anticipation of the feast. It is a marvel to see the excitement of 
the children at these times, as it is also to see that of the otherwise jaded and world weary.  
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I hope now it will be plain why I say that our only hope, even at the merely political 
level, lies with the churches. Rational discourse is powerless against the passions. In a way, the 
more cogent such discourse is, the more it is threatening and therefore to be feared. One in the 
grip of the passions hears in any opposing argument merely the message You are wrong. If 
anything, this simply inflames them even more. What such a person needs is not to be refuted, 
but to be shown by living example that the freedom we all innately desire is possible. Even just 
to know that others are fighting against the passions can sometimes have a powerful effect. It is 
one thing to be a slave; it is quite another to think that all are slaves. 
I hope too it will be plain why only the churches can take on this fight. No one can battle 
against the passions alone. Granted that there have been saintly hermits, upon examination it 
turns out that they too thought of themselves as following a trail that had been blazed by others. 
It would seem to be the very nature of the abnegation of self-will that it requires direction from 
without—as well as, of course, the continual check upon presumption that is provided by 
practices such as confession. To fight alone runs the risk of what St. Paul calls ethelothreskeia, a 
willful and self-chosen form of worship (Col. 2:23). Even success merely exhibits to oneself 
one’s own inner strength. That is why it is necessary to fight in ways and at times dictated by 
others, alongside children, the derelict, and casual believers—all who by their very weakness 
manifest God’s strength. 
Only the churches have it in their power to be communities of those who struggle 
together for the healing and transformation of the passions. Yes, it is true that our churches today 
are weak reeds. Each of us could compile his own list of complaints against them, and for the 
most part we all would be right. Yet God is known for what he can do with the weak; it even 
seems to be his specialty.  
